Marquette Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 3 1976 (Number 3)

Article 5

A Primer on Docket Number 18110: The New
FCC Cross-Ownership Rules
Roxanne Decyk Young

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Roxanne Decyk Young, A Primer on Docket Number 18110: The New FCC Cross-Ownership Rules, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 584 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol59/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

A PRIMER ON DOCKET NUMBER 18110: THE
NEW FCC CROSS-OWNERSHIP RULES
The communications industry, previously relatively untouched by federal antitrust activity, has come under direct
attack from the FCC recently as a result of the adoption of
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast stations; Second Report and Order' in January, 1975. The
FCC and the media have engaged in a spirited dialogue for the
past five years concerning the validity, purposes and parameters of the Order, known as Docket No. 18110. With the adoption of the Second Order, proceedings in relation to Docket No.
18110 were terminated and regulations affecting media concentration2 were finalized.

The Order has three significant effects on the communications industry. First, seven television station cross-ownerships
and nine radio station cross-ownerships must be divested by
1980. 3 Secondly, groups of media vehicles now under cross1.
2.
given
3.

40 Fed. Reg. 6449 (1975).
Media concentration is a measure of the diversity of ownership of media in a
geographical area.
40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6468 (1975):
Appendix D
TV Station Monopolies-Divestiture Required
City and State:

TV Call Letters

Alabama, Anniston
Georgia, Albany
Iowa, Mason City
Mississippi, Meridian
New York, Watertown
Texas, Texarkana
West Virginia, Bluefield

WMMA
WALB
KGLO
WTOK
WWNY
KTAL
WHIS

Appendix E
AM and FM Station Monopolies-Divestiture Required
City and State:
Arkansas, Hope
Illinois, Effingham
Illinois, Macomb
Kansas, Arkansas City
Michigan, Owosso
Nebraska, Norfolk
Ohio, Findlay
Pennsylvania, DuBois
Wisconsin, Janesville

AM Call Letters
KXAR
WCRA
WKAI
KSOK
WOAP
WJAG
WFIN
WCED
WCLO

FM Call Letters
WCRA-FM
WKAI-FM
WOAP-FM
WJAG-FM
WFIN-FM
WCED-FM
WJVL

COMMENTS

19761

ownership may no longer be transferred intact. 4 Thirdly, acquisition of multiple media vehicles in the future is prohibited. 5
This article will review the authority of the FCC in antitrust
regulation, the proceedings contained in Docket No. 18110, the
practical and constitutional challenges to the Order, and the
effect of the Order on the communications industry. The Order
itself has not yet been tested in the courts, but numerous legal
and practical challenges have already been offered through
administrative comments and oral argument.6 It is likely that
the same arguments will be made either in litigation or as part
of the application by an individual media owner for waiver of
the rule.

I.

AUTHORITY OF THE

FCC

The Federal Communications Commission has, since its
inception, endorsed a policy favoring diversification of ownership of communications media. The policy derives from at least
three specific sources-the First Amendment to the Constitution,7 the Communications Act of 1934,8 and federal antitrust
principles?
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment has been relied upon by both the
FCC as authority for its diversification of ownership policy and
by the communications industry as a defense to that policy."0
The constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression and of
A cross-ownership exists when two or more media vehicles (such as an AM and FM
radio station) are commonly owned by the same person or group. It is obvious that
problems arise in the application of any regulations in this area based on the definitions of ownership. For example, is a bank trust department which has invested heavily
in several media corporations a cross-owner within the meaning of the Order?
4. Id. at 6468-71.
5. Id.
6. The FCC commenced work on this Order by publishing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. Thereafter, any interested party was entitled to file a brief, consisting of
objections to or arguments in favor of the impending regulations. Additionally, some
parties presented oral arguments and statistical studies to the Commission. Before the
final Order was promulgated, the FCC considered all briefs, studies and arguments
submitted on the topic.
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1934).
9. Mulitple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations; Second Report and Order (hereinafter Second Report), 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6450 (1975).
10. Id. at 6450-51.
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the press are more fully protected, according to the FCC, by
encouraging the maximum number of channels of expression."
"It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited market place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government or by a private
licensee.' 1 2 "It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences that is crucial here. That right may not be constitutionally abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.' 3 The
principle of diversification of ownership is effectuated under
the authority of the Communications Act of 1934 and through
FCC cognizance of federal antitrust policy.
B. The CommunicationsAct of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the FCC to
adopt rules governing the issuance of broadcast licenses which
would prohibit -cross-ownership of broadcast stations or newspapers and broadcast stations in the same geographic area."
Specifically, section 309(a) requires the Commission to promote the "public interest, convenience and necessity"' 5 in
granting licenses. "Public interest" has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to include such factors as "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."' 6 The Commission has adopted the position that diverse and antagonistic sources are necessarily separately owned
sources, and that greater diversity of expression is encouraged
when media channels are both owned and operated by as many
different persons as possible. 7
C. FederalAntitrust Policy
Although the Justice Department rather than the FCC is
authorized to enforce the antitrust laws, the FCC has assumed
the authority to promote antitrust policies under the "public
11.
12.
13.
14.
(1934).
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 6451.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 2(a), 4(i), 4(j), 301, 303, 309(a)
Id. at § 309(a).
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6454 (1975).
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interest" qualification of its licensing function.' 8 Since the
communications industry is considered commerce, it is subject
to both federal antitrust laws enforced by the Justice Department and administrative regulations enforced by the FCC.
Two congressional acts are regarded as the basis for federal
antitrust policy. The Sherman Act of 1890'1 prohibits
"contract[s], combination[s] . . . or conspirac[ies] in restraint of. . . trade or commerce." 20 The Clayton Act of 1914,21
specifically the subsequently enacted section 7 (known as the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950),22 is particularly relevant to the
communications industry. It forbids corporations from acquiring stock or assets of a competing corporation "where . . . the
effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly. ' 23 Although the portions of the
Second Order that apply prospectively spring primarily from
First Amendment considerations, the order to divest is a direct
expression of federal antitrust law.
Case Law
Case law resulting from challenges to FCC antitrust authority has strongly supported the Commission's efforts to decentralize media ownership and access. The preeminent decision
in this area is Associated Press v. United States2 4 in which the
FCC succeeded in striking down restrictive press service bylaws. Prior to World War II, the Associated Press operated
under by-laws which prevented members from selling news to
nonmembers and granted Associated Press members a virtual
veto power over competing newspapers' attempts to gain membership. One of several suits decided under this decision involved attempts by publisher Marshall Field to obtain Associated Press membership for the Chicago Sun, a newspaper in
competition with the Chicago Tribune. The Justice Department charged that the conduct of the Associated Press, the
Tribune and other defendants constituted "(1) a combination
and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in news
D.

18.
19:
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1934).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
Id. at § 1.
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
Id. at § 18.
Id.
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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among the states, and (2) an attempt to monopolize a part of
that trade. '25 Although the defendants argued that enforcement of the Sherman Act in this case would constitute a violation of First Amendment freedom of the press, the Supreme
Court was not persuaded, adopting instead Judge Learned
Hand's conclusion from the appellate court decision
. . . that [the newspaper] industry serves one of the most
vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from
as many different sources, and with as many different facets
and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if
indeed it is not the same as the interest protected by the First
Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is,
and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.26
Federal authority to enforce diversity of ownership of the
channels of media and thereby diversity of expression was solidified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions finding antitrust violations in such circumstances as discriminatory refusal
of advertising in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States2 7 and
restraint of the circulation of news in United States v. TimesPicayune Publishing Co.2" Early foundation for the Second
Order was laid when the Court recognized FCC authority to
regulate concentration of stations under the same control in
United States v. Storer BroadcastingCo. 21 The 1975 Order itself evolves logically from the decision in United States v.
Times Mirror Company0 which involved an attempt by the
publisher of California's largest daily newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, to purchase the largest independent daily publisher
in Southern California.
These decisions, combined with numerous findings affirming the FCC's discretion in licensing of the use of the radio
spectrum, 3' are relied upon by the Commission to support the
regulations which have issued from Docket No. 18110.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 28, quoting Judge Hand, Associated Press v. United States, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (D.C. N.Y. 1943).
27. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
28. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
29. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
30. 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), af'd without opinion, 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
31. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Clarksburg
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II.

DOCKET

No. 18110

The Commission's actions since 1970 cannot be considered
as an isolated attempt at antitrust regulation. The FCC has for
almost forty years actively pursued decentralization of media
ownership, not only in conjunction with the Justice Department in antitrust litigation, but also through administrative
rules and regulations and its discretionary control over the
granting and renewal of broadcast licenses.
Multiple ownership was first investigated by the FCC in
1938, followed by promulgation of the first multiple ownership
rules in 1940.32 These early rules limited any one owner to five
broadcasting stations (this has since been expanded to seven
with qualifications as to the type of media involved). Other
multiple ownership rules were adopted in 1941, 3 1943, ' and
1944.31 Investigation of newspaper ownership of broadcasting
commenced in 1941 and continued until 1944.6 Investigations
3
were resumed in the early 1950's and again in the mid-1960's. 1
Proceedings on Docket No. 18110 began in 1968 with the
adoption of a Notice of ProposedRule-Making8 which, broadly
speaking, proscribed common ownership of TV-AM, TV-FM or
AM-FM combinations in the same market. The rules were intended to be prospective only, with no requirement of divestiture of existing combinations. Subsequently, new rules resulting from the First Order9 and its modifications in a
Memorandum Opinion and Order0 prohibited common
ownership of VHF television stations and aural stations in the
same market. Although AM-FM combinations were permitted
by the Commission, there was no hint of common newspaperbroadcast ownership restrictions or of divestiture (although
Publishing Co. v. F.C.C., 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.
v. F.C.C., 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830; Plains Radio
Broadcasting Company v. F.C.C., 175 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
32. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.636, 73.240 (1974).
33. 47 C.F.R. § 4.226 (1974).
34. F.C.C. Tenth Annual Report 11 (1944).
35. 47 C.F.R. § 4.226 (1944).
36. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.636, 73.240 (1974).
37. H. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED.
COMMUNICATIONs B.J. 1, 21, 41 (1974).
38. 33 Fed. Reg. 5315 (1968).
39. 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970).
40. 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
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multiple ownerships of VHF and aural stations could not be
sold intact).
Also in 1970, the Commission adopted a FurtherNotice of
Proposed Rule-Making4 ' which contained a proposal requiring
divestiture within five years of common ownership of broadcast
stations and daily newspapers in the same market.
The Docket represented the most vigorous attempt yet by
the FCC to encourage diverse media ownership. To do this, the
Commission relied upon basic antitrust considerations to define the type of media concentration which would exceed minimum diversity requirements. 2 First, the Commission established that two or more media vehicles, for example a television
station and a daily newspaper, constitute a relevant product
market. 3 The Commission explained their conclusion by
means of an industrial analogy:
if a steel company seeks to acquire an aluminum company,
does this constitute a form of horizontal integration leading
perhaps to impermissible oligopolistic concentration? To answer the question requires among other things a determination of the relevant product market, and, in this example, a
knowledge about the conditions under which aluminum or
steel could be used as substitutes for one another, either generally or in some particular uses . . . According to the De-

partment of Justice, newspaper and television stations are in
many ways engaged in the same business, namely attracting
audiences and selling them to advertisers.4
Secondly, the FCC determined what area constitutes a relevant geographic market. 5 Although the Order itself is phrased
41. 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970).
42. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
43. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6453 (1975). The guiding principle as to
relvant product markets is described in Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 325 (1962):
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product
itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well-defined
submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for
antitrust purposes. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company, 353
U.S. 586, 595. The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by
examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of such submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity
to price changes, and specialized vendors.
44. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6453 (1975).
45. Id.

COMMENTS

19761

in terms of broadcast terminology, essentially a violative combination results when two or more media in combination encompass a particular city or town." Although media combinations may have far-reaching effects in any particular geographic area, unless both elements, the product market and
geographic market, are valid, there is no antitrust basis for
condemnation of cross-ownership. The Justice Department has
stated that:
[i]t must be understood that our analysis of a merger in the
media field is basically no different from our analysis in any
other field ....
[T]he Antitrust Division must make an
analysis which is essentially economic. In the media business,
as in all other businesses, if we cannot find a provable economic effect in an identifiable market, there is47 no action we
can take under Section 7 to prevent a merger.
The Order has not yet been tested in the courts, but several
issues are apparent from even a cursory review of the changes
adopted. If, for example, the FCC's appropriation of Justice
Department antitrust techniques is not a valid administrative
action, the FCC will have to defend the Order solely on its First
Amendment policy principles.
Ill.

CHALLENGES TO THE ORDER

A plethora of comments, replies and studies has been filed
at the FCC in reaction to Docket No. 18110, both supporting
and challenging the validity of the Order. Challenges to the
Order fall within four general classifications: (1) First Amendment challenges, (2) Fifth Amendment challenges, (3) authority of the FCC to effectuate antitrust policy, and (4) validity
of the relevant product market and relevant geographic market
definitions adopted by the FCC.
More than one hundred and fifty organizations, including
the Green Bay Newspaper Company, The Journal Company,
the Kenosha News, and the Wisconsin Daily Newspaper
League, filed comments on the validity of the Order.4" WTMJradio filed a brief for an administrative oral argument on
46. Id. at 6468-71.
47. C. Mahaffie, Mergers and Diversificationin the Newspaper, Broadcastingand
Information Industries, 13 AN'rrRausT BULL. 927, 930-31 (1968).
48. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6465-66 (1975).
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Docket No. 18110.19 More than twenty major studies were submitted on the subject." Many of the individual challenges consist of the same or similar arguments, so this section will review
the most significant arguments offered by large media associations and those generating the most controversy.
A. FirstAmendment Challenges
The freedom of a newspaper owner to publish was the substance of one of several challenges made by the American
Newspaper Publishers Association (hereinafter ANPA) to the
Order. ANPA charged that the Order requiring divestiture of
either a newspaper or television station if both the only daily
newspaper and the only television station for a given area are
owned by the same person violated the freedom of the press.'
The Commission defended its position by relying on Associated
Press v. United States:52
First, the Commission is following the long established policy
of promoting the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" . . . [sic] (citation omitted). Second, the First Amendment does not protect
business relations that are either unlawful or not in the public
interest. Finally, we believe the opponents overstate their
case in this and in the other arguments. The Commission has
never proposed and is not now proposing to prohibit someone
from owning a newspaper and a television station. It is plain
that what we are doing is grandfathering present newspapertelevision owner combinations; we are only requiring
divesti53
ture in egregious cases . . . .(emphasis added).
Though the Commission's diversification of ownership policy has been upheld by the Supreme Court, the Commission
relies on both its diversification policy and antitrust considerations appropriated from the Justice Department in the Order.
Associated Press provided judicial approval of the FCC policy,
i.e., diversity of ownership and expression. In addition, it was
specifically in the face of a concerted combination to restrain
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6450.
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6450-51 (1975).
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trade in news, which is distinguishable from a mere crossownership. In Associated Press the court stated:
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public, that a free press is a condition of a free society ...
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some.
Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests. 4
The ANPA argued that if it cannot be shown that illegal combinations of media exist, then newspaper-television combinations do not fall within the influence of Associated Press since
there was no combination to keep others from publishing.
The second FCC argument, that illegal business combinations are not protected by the First Amendment, is difficult to
refute. However, the ANPA argued that cross-ownerships, even
within the parameters delineated by the Commission, are not
unlawful per se or violative of the public interest based on the
ANPA's challenge of the definitions of relevant product market
and relevant geographic market. 5 These challenges are
discussed more fully below.
The FCC's statement that it will order divestiture only in
egregious cases seems more offensive than placatory. Not only
is an egregious case not defined, but that definition presumably
will be made by the Commission itself.
All of the FCC's First Amendment considerations supporting divestiture are susceptible to cogent argument from the
media's point of view as well. Until the arguments are resolved
through litigation, the First Amendment challenges are likely
to retain a great deal of support within the communications
industry.
B. Fifth Amendment Challenges
The ANPA also argued that the Order violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, particularly in the
54. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
55. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6450-51 (1975).
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case of newspaper owners, because the FCC is discriminating
against a class. 6 The Commission correctly asserts, however,
that "[riules that treat in an equal manner all parties whose
activities raise similar public interest problems are not discriminatory."- 7 The ANPA has rebutted this argument on two
grounds: (1) the definition of a "public interest" problem, like
the definition of an egregious case, is too indefinite, and (2)
there is evidence that the order would have a particularly
harmful effect upon newspaper-television owners because of
the economics of their business."
The FCC has admitted that newspaper-licensed stations
often provide superior service to the public, but they attribute
that superiority not to the common ownership, but rather to
"journalistic traditions and pioneering broadcast operations."59
Communications industry data, on the other hand, attributes
this superiority to other causes, specifically to the fact that
many newspapers can afford to operate only as a result of the
profitability of a co-owned television station. The loss of these
combinations, either through immediate divestiture or through
separation of the operations at a future sale, would, according
to the ANPA, actually reduce the number of newspapers which
could afford to operate and thus undercut the FCC's avowed
policy of diversification of media. 0
It is interesting to note that in the May, 1975 Memorandum
Opinion and Order6 the FCC seems to have given at least
partial recognition to the ANPA's argument: ". . . looking
only at the small superiority obscures the important gain in
diversity which would result. We continue to believe that absent unusual circumstances, diversity is the more important
point when it can be achieved without hardship or disruption."
(emphasis added)2 Thus, though any Fifth Amendment objection may be argued persuasively from either side, the financial
practicalities of the communications industry might necessitate intensive Commission review of individual waiver applica56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 6451.
Id.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 75-627, 5 (1975).
Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6453 (1975).
Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 75-627, 5 (1975).
Id.
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tions and require some amount of flexibility in order to regulate
most efficiently in light of the exigencies of any given situation.
C. FCC Authority to Promulgate Rules
Sharp criticism has been leveled at both the FCC and the
Justice Department charging that the 1975 rule is merely the
result of an improper attempt by the Justice Department to
regulate the communications industry through the FCC. A former FCC Commissioner stated that: ". . . in my opinion, what
the Department of Justice is doing in this instance is abusing
legal process, or, if you prefer, trying to blackmail the FCC into
following the course that the Department of Justice thinks it
6' 3
should follow. And I submit that this is improper.
There is a practical reason for the Justice Department's
interest in reaching antitrust violations through the Commission; the FCC reviews all licenses granted to broadcast stations
every three years when they come up for renewal. The FCC's
only available remedy is to deny renewal, but it is a remedy
which the Justice Department could not use in standard antitrust litigation.64 The FCC acting without the 1975 Order could,
at best, order to hearing cases to which the Justice Department
had filed petitions and there is no way that the Commission,
under its present administrative procedure, could handle the
number of hearings which would result. 5
While it is something of a departure from standard procedure for the FCC to order divestiture, there is little legal
authority to contest the Order on that basis alone. However,
commentators have relied on Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange" to challenge antitrust considerations as a basis for
the divestiture policy:
Under the Communications Act, as under the Commodity
Exchange Act, the area of administrative authority does not
appear to be particularly focused on competitive considerations; there is no express provision in the Act directing administrative officials to consider the policy of the antitrust
laws in carrying out their duties and there is no other indica63. L. Loevinger, Antitrust and Regulated Industries: Collision Course?:
Communications, 43 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 359, 366 (1974).
64. Id. at 365.
65. Id. at 365-66.
66. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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tion that Congress intended the adjudicative authority given
the Commission

. .

.to be a complete substitute for judicial

enforcement of the antitrust laws. 7

Another challenge of the FCC's rule-making authority was
made by the ANPA, questioning the Commission's authority
to issue rules directly affecting newspaper owners.6" Relying
9 they pointed to the Court's
heavily on Stahlman v. FCC,"
statement that
[i]f in this case it had been made to appear, as counsel for
appellant insist, that the Commission's investigation was
solely for the purpose of the consideration or adoption of a
hard and fast rule or policy, as a result of which newspaper
owners may be placed in a proscribed class and thus made
ineligible to apply for or receive broadcast licenses, we should
be obliged to declare that such an investigation would be
wholly outside of and beyond any of the powers with which
Congress has clothed the Commission. 0
However, the FCC has distinguished cross-ownerships from the
facts in Stahlman which "deals with newspaper owners in general and is not related to the issues in this proceeding."' 7' Crossownership orders, according to the FCC, do not apply across
the board to newspaper owners; a newspaper owner is free to
obtain broadcast licenses if they are not within the relevant
geographic market. Only when the dual considerations of public interest and antitrust policy are threatened does the Order
take effect.
Validity of the Relevant Product Market and Relevant
Geographic Market Adopted
Vehement criticism has been directed toward the FCC's
conclusion that newspapers and television stations constitute
a relevant product market and that the city and its environs
constitute a relevant geographic market for communication
purposes.
D.

67. C. Hobb, Antitrust Exemption Areas, 42 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 881, 898
(1973).
68. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6451 (1975).
69. 126 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
70. Id. at 127. See also Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 96 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir.
1938); McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
71. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6451 (1975).
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1. Relevant Product Market
The communications industry has functioned for many
years on the advertising and marketing premises that television
broadcast time and newspaper space are not fungible,7 2 or even
similar enough to be used for the same purposes.
For purposes of the antitrust considerations of the Order,
however, the FCC has determined that, as advertising vehicles,
radio, television and daily newspapers constitute a relevant
73
product market.
Commentators from the industry have reacted stongly to
this.
The simplistic notion that television and newspaper advertising functions are so similar in characteristics and uses
as to constitute a single product universe wilts under the
glare of analysis. Such an argument ignores the imprint of
recent influences bequeathed by the evolution of the economy, it evades the ramifications of some basic techniques in
marketing strategy, and it does
not pay heed to the conse74
quences of modem technology.
In fact, the industry has gone so far in its criticism of this
determination as to state that
• . . the conclusion is inescapable that the Justice Department has indulged in an exercise of convoluted gerrymandering to create an aberration fitting the description of what Mr.
Justice Fortas once called a "strange red-haired, bearded,
one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification."7
The basis for these criticisms lies in practical media strategy. Advertisers regard television and print as distinct and
complementary advertising vehicles rather than interchangeable media. Yearly, advertising and marketing population demographic studies reveal, to the satisfaction of businessmen
spending many millions of dollars per year, that distinct audiences with markedly divergent characteristics can be reached
through the unique qualities of messages conveyed through dif7
ferent types of media. 1
72. S.DUNN,

ADVERTISING: ITS ROLE IN MODERN MARKETING 437 (2d ed. 1969).
73. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6453 (1975).
74. A. Austin, The Credibility of a Television-Newspaper Advertising Relevant

Product Market, 27

FED. COMMUNICATIONS

B.J. 251, 253 (1974).

75. Id.

76. See, e.g., E. CUNDIFF & R.

STILL, BASIC MARKETING

512 (1964); A.

BARBON & C.
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Since the ultimate issue under section 7 of the Clayton Act
is the effect on competition, media owners have argued strongly
that according to the competition test presented in U.S. v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours," these media are not "reasonably interchangeable."7 8 The Court indicated that the final position of
the market line depends upon
. . .how different from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go to substitute
one commodity for another. For example, one can think of
building materials as in commodity competition but one
could hardly say that brick competed with steel or wood or
cement or stone in the meaning of Sherman Act litigation;
the products are too different. 9
The differences between newspapers and television were
thoroughly catalogued in U.S. v. Citizen Publishing Co. 0 The
trial court concluded, from charges of violation of Clayton section 7 and monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act
against two Tucson newspapers, that the relevant product market was restricted to the newspaper business based on price,
use and quality differences betweeen the two media.8 1In light
of the legal and statistical support for challenges to the Commission's determination of the relevant product universe, it is
likely that this point will be highly contested.
2. Relevant Geographic Market
Inconsistency is apparent even in the FCC's approach to
determination of the relevant geographic market in numerous
situations. In Frontierv. FCC,82 the Commission used the city
and its environs rather than the grade B, or wide-area, coverage
of the television station in question. In the 1975 Order,the FCC
relies upon the smaller grade A contour of television broadcast.8 3 Additionally, market-share determinations for newspapers have varied from study to study.84
197 (1968); C.
(5th ed. 1958).
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The National Citizens' Committee for Broadcasting has
urged adoption of the deJonckheerel5 study on market share.
Using this method, various weights would be attributed to
radio, television and daily newspapers in a given area, and
concentration of media would be determined on the basis of a
combination of the relative weights.8 6 This approach would
avoid the inflexible ban used by the FCC which is less sensitive
to individual market characteristics.
It is almost impossible for the FCC to avoid the highly
arbitrary nature of delineating geographic markets. Since relatively minor market deviations can result in major differences
in applicability of the Order to individual cross-ownerships,
review of cross-ownerships on a case-by-case basis would provide the most equitable approach to resolving whatever violations may exist.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE ORDER
Conversations with Justice Department attorneys instrumental in the promulgation of the Order have revealed a basic
desire on their part to break up communications conglomerates
owned by "media barons. 8' 7 However, those cross-ownerships
directly affected by the order are relatively small media combinations. It is not unlikely that large communications conglomerates, with the resources and sophistication to obtain waivers
and circumvent certain regulations and requirements, will be
virtually unaffected, while less significant combinations, already operating at a financial disadvantage, will be hardest hit.
One of the first major acquisitions directly affected by the
Order became national news during the summer of 1975.28 A
Texas banker, Joseph Allbritton, attempted to acquire the faltering Washington Star and its associated broadcast stations.
The Star, in dire financial straits, provided the only real competition to the Washington Post. The owners of the Star
newspaper-broadcast combination refused to sell the Star unless the combination was sold intact. Although waiver applica85. T. DEJONCKHEERE, MONOPOLY IN THE MEDIA (1968).
86. Second Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449, 6454 (1975).
87. Conversation with Sinclair Gearing, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. See
also N. Johnson, Media Barons and the Public Interest, ATLANTIC, June, 1968 at 4351.
88. Broadcast, Aug. 4, 1975 at 23.
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tion was filed two months before promulgation of the Order,
the Commission waited until July, 1975 to decide that waivers
could not be granted without a hearing. The Commission not
only set a precedent as to its unwillingness to grant waivers to
cross-ownership rules, but acted slowly and indecisively in an
urgent situation. Treasury Secretary Simon was quoted as saying,
A guy comes to town to try to save the only other newspaper
we have in Washington D.C.-and for nine months they [the
FCC] fool around with it and then say, "We need another
year to make a decision." I think it's damn unfair. . .I think
it's unconscionable . . . Does [the Star] have to go out of
business in a year as a result of inaction on the part of
government? 9
It remains to be seen whether the Commission will respond
more quickly in future situations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The 1975 Order and Report will continue to draw harsh
criticism from the communications industry. Lee Loevinger, a
former Commissioner, has stated that "[o]bviously, there is
no concentration. There is no monopoly anywhere in terms of
access to the public here. In fact, the contrary is the case; we
are inundated by the loud clamoring voices seeking our attention."
Not only is the Order itself controversial, the charges of
improper Justice Department interference with the activities of
a regulatory agency are not likely to be ignored. The economic
practicalities of the communications industry are bound to
force this issue into a final determination by the courts.
ROXANNE DECYK YOUNG
89. Id. at 24.
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APPENDIX

1. Section 73.35 of the Commission's rules and regulations
is amended to read as follows:
§ 73.35 Multiple ownership.
(a) No license for a standard broadcast station shall be
granted to any party (including all parties under common control) if such party directly or indirectly owns, operates, or controls: one or more standard broadcast stations and the grant of
such license will result in any overlap of the predicted or measured 1 mV/m groundwave contours of the existing and proposed stations, computed in accordance with § 73.183 or §
73.186; or one or more television broadcast stations and the
grant of such license will result in the predicted or measured 2
mV/m groundwave contour of the proposed station, computed
in accordance with § 73.183 or § 73.186, encompassing the entire community of license of one of the television broadcast
stations or will result in the Grade A contour(s) of the television
broadcast station(s), computed in accordance with § 73.684,
encompassing the entire community of license of the proposed
station; or a daily newspaper and the grant of such license will
result in the predicted or measured 2 mV/m contour, computed
in accordance with § 73.183 or § 73.186, encompassing the entire community in which such newspaper is published.
(b) No license for a standard broadcast station shall be
granted to any party (including all parties under common control) if such party, or any stockholder, officer or director of such
party, directly or indirectly owns, operates, controls, or has any
interest in, or is an officer or director of any other standard
broadcast station if the grant of such license would result in a
concentration of control of standard broadcasting in a manner
inconsistent with public interest, convenience, or necessity. In
determining whether there is such a concentration of control,
consideration will be given to the facts of each case with particular reference to such factors as the size, extent and location
of areas served, the number of people served, classes of stations
involved and the extent of other competitive service to the
areas in question. The Commission, however, will in any event
consider that there would be such a concentration of control
contrary to the public interest, convenience or necessity for any
party or any of its stockholders, officers or directors to have a
direct or indirect interest in or be stockholders, officers, or
directors of, more than seven standard broadcast stations.
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(c) No renewal of license shall be granted for a term extending beyond January 1, 1980, to any party that as of January 1,
1975, directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls the only
daily newspaper published in a community and also as of January 1, 1975, directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls the
only commercial aural station or stations which place(s) a citygrade signal over the community during daytime hours. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not require divestiture of any
interest not in conformity with its provisions earlier than January 1, 1980. Divestiture is not required if there is a separately
owned, operated or controlled television broadcast station licensed to serve the community.
2. Section 73.240 of the Commission's rules and regulations
is amended to read as follows:
§ 73.240 Multiple ownership.
(a)(1) No license for an FM broadcast station shall be
granted to any party (including all parties under common control) if such party directly or indirectly owns, operates, or controls: one or more FM broadcast stations and the grant of such
license will result in any overlap of the predicted 1 mV/m contours of the existing and proposed stations, computed in accordance with § 73.313; or one or more television broadcast
stations and the grant of such license will result in the predicted 1 mV/m contour of the proposed station, computed in
accordance with § 73.313, encompassing the entire community
of license of one of the television broadcast stations or will
result in the Grade A contour(s) of the television broadcast
station(s), computed in accordance with § 73.684, encompassing the entire community of license of the proposed station; or
a daily newspaper and the grant of such license will result in
the predicted 1 mV/m contour, computed in accordance with
§ 73.313, encompassing the entire community in which such
newspaper is published.
(2) No license for an FM broadcast station shall be granted
to any party (including all parties under common control) if
such party, or any stockholder, officer or director of such party,
directly or indirectly owns, operates, controls, or has any interest in, or is an officer or director of any other FM broadcast
station in the grant of such license would result in a concentration of control of FM broadcasting in a manner inconsistent
with the public interest convenience, or necessity. In determining whether there is such a concentration of control, considera-
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tion will be given to the facts of each case with particular
reference to such factors as the size, extent and location of
areas served, the number of people served, classes of stations
involved and the extent of other competitive service to the
areas in question. The Commission, however, will in any event
consider that there would be such a concentration of control
contrary to the public interest, convenience or necessity for any
party or any of its stockholders, officers or directors to have a
direct or indirect interest in, or be stockholders, officers, or
directors of, more than seven FM broadcast stations.
(b) Paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section are not applicable
to noncommercial educational FM stations.
(c) No renewal of license shall be granted for a term extending beyond January 1, 1980, to any party that as of January 1,
1975, directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls the only
daily newspaper published in a community and also as of January 1, 1975, direct or indirectly owns, operates or controls the
only commercial aural station or stations which place(s) a citygrade signal over the community during daytime hours. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not require divestiture of any
interest not in conformity with its provisions earlier than January 1, 1980. Divestiture is not required if there is a separately
owned, operated or controlled television broadcast station licensed to serve the community.
3. Section 73.636 of the Commission's rules and regulations
is amended to read as follows:
§ 73.636 Multiple ownership.
(a) (1) No license for a television broadcast station shall be
granted to any party (including all parties under common control) if such party directly or indirectly owns, operates, or controls: one or more television broadcast stations and the grant
of such license will result in any overlap of the Grade B contours of the existing and proposed stations, computed in accordance with § 73.684; or one or more standard broadcast
stations and the grant of such license will result in the Grade
A contour of the proposed station, computed in accordance
with § 73.684, encompassing the entire community of license
of one of the standard broadcast stations, or will result in the
predicted or measured 2 mV/m groundwave contour(s) of the
standard broadcast station(s), computed in accordance with §
73.183 or § 73.186, encompassing the entire community of license of the proposed station, or one or more FM broadcast
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stations and the grant of such license will result in the Grade
A contour of the proposed station, computed in accordance
with § 73.684, encompassing the entire community of license
of one of the FM broadcast stations, or will result in the
predicted 1 mV/m contour(s) of the FM broadcast station(s),
computed in accordance with § 73.313, encompassing the entire community of license of the proposed station; or a daily
newspaper and the grant of such license will result in the Grade
A contour, computed in accordance with § 73.684, encompassing the entire community in which such newspaper is published.
(2) No license for a television broadcast station shall be
granted to any party (including all parties under common control) if such party, or any stockholder, officer or director of such
party directly or indirectly owns, operates, controls, or has any
interest in, or is an officer or director of any other television
broadcast station if the grant of such license would result in a
concentration of control of television broadcasting in a manner
inconsistent with public interest, convenience, or necessity. In
determining whether there is such a concentration of control,
consideration will be given to the facts of each case with particular reference to such factors as the size, extent and location
of areas served, the number of people served, and the extent of
other competitive service to the areas in question. The Commission, however, will in any event consider that there would
be such a concentration of control contrary to the public interest, convenience or necessity for any party or any of its stockholders, officers or directors to have a direct or indirect interest
in, or be stockholders, officers, or directors of, more than seven
television broadcast stations, no more than five or which may
be in the VHF band.
(b) Paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section are not applicable
to noncommercial educational television stations.
(c) No renewal of license shall be granted for a term extending beyond January 1, 1980, to any party that as of January 1,
1975, directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls the only
commercial television station which places a city-grade signal
over the community. The provisions of this paragraph shall not
require divestiture of any interest not in conformity with its
provisions earlier than January 1, 1980.

